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Abstract—We consider the problem of communicating infor-
mation over a network secretly and reliably in the presence of a
hidden adversary who can eavesdrop and inject malicious errors.
We provide polynomial-time, rate-optimal distributed network
codes for this scenario, improving on the rates achievable in [1].
Our main contribution shows that as long as the sum of the
adversary’s jamming rate ZO and his eavesdropping rate ZI
is less than the network capacity C, (i.e., ZO + ZI < C), our
codes can communicate (with vanishingly small error probability)
a single bit correctly and without leaking any information to
the adversary. We then use this to design codes that allow
communication at the optimal source rate of C−ZO−ZI , while
keeping the communicated message secret from the adversary.
Interior nodes are oblivious to the presence of adversaries and
perform random linear network coding; only the source and
destination need to be tweaked. In proving our results we correct
an error in prior work [2] by a subset of the authors in this work.
I. INTRODUCTION
A source Alice wishes to transmit information to a receiver
Bob over a network containing a malicious adversary Calvin.
Such scenarios face at least two challenges – Calvin might
eavesdrop on private communications, or he might disrupt
communications by injecting fake information into the net-
work. In the network coding model this second danger may
be even more pronounced since all nodes, including honest
ones, mix information. In this case, even a small number of
fake packets injected by Calvin may end up corrupting all the
information flowing in the network, causing decoding errors.
In this work we consider the secrecy and error control
issues together. Namely, we design schemes that allow reliable
network communications in the presence of an adversary that
can both jam and eavesdrop, without leaking information to
him. In particular, suppose the network’s min-cut from Alice
to Bob is C, and Calvin eavesdrops on ZI links and corrupts
ZO links1. We demonstrate schemes that are distributed,
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1We consider a model where network links rather than nodes are eaves-
dropped and corrupted; eavesdropping on a node is equivalent to eavesdrop-
ping on links incoming to it, and corrupting a node is equivalent to corrupting
the links outgoing from it.
computationally efficient to design and implement, and can be
used to communicate a single bit secretly and without error.
We then use this scheme as a tool to improve on prior work [3],
and achieve a provably optimal rate of C − ZO − ZI .
Related problems have been considered in the past. Prior
results may be classified in the following three categories.
For networks containing adversaries that only eavesdrop
on some links (without jamming transmissions), the work
of [4] provided a tight information-theoretic characterization of
the secrecy capacity, i.e., the optimal rate achievable without
leaking any of Alice’s information to Calvin. Efficient schemes
achieving this performance were proposed by [5]–[7]. Crypto-
graphically (but not information-theoretically) secret schemes
for this scenario were also considered in [8].
For networks containing adversaries with unlimited eaves-
dropping capabilities and limited jamming capabilities, prior
related work has focused primarily on the detection of Byzan-
tine errors [9], non-constructive bounds on the achievable zero-
error rates [10], [11], and network error-correcting codes [12]
(which have high design complexity) and [2], [3], [13], [14]
(which have low design complexity). Results for this setting
are also available under cryptographic assumptions [15], [16].
The scenario closest to the one considered in this work,
with limitations on both Calvin’s eavesdropping power ZI
and his jamming power ZO, have been considered in [1]–[3],
[17], [18]. Under the requirement of zero error probability,
the maximum rate of secret and reliable communication is
given by C − 2ZO − ZI . Schemes achieving this rate have
been proposed in [1], [18] (high design complexity schemes)
and [17], [19], [20] (low design complexity schemes). The
optimality of such a rate has been shown in [1] for single-
letter coding and in [20] for block coding.
If the requirement of zero error probability is relaxed to
vanishingly small error probability, as considered here, then
higher rates may be achieved. In particular, the work in [3]
provided computationally efficient communication schemes
(but with no guarantees on secrecy) at rate C − ZO as long
as the technical requirement C > 2ZO + ZI was satisfied.
Work by a subset of the authors of this paper claimed in [2]
to improve this technical requirement to C > ZO + ZI . As
we demonstrate in Section VIII, prior proof of the claim was
incorrect, and Section II gives a correct proof of the claim.
Combining these results with the secrecy scheme of [7] allows
us to obtain the optimal rate of C − ZO − ZI when secrecy
constraints are incorporated.
II. MAIN RESULTS
The main results of this work are Theorems 1 and 2.
Theorem 1: If C > ZO − ZI then Alice can commu-
nicate a single bit correctly to Bob (while keeping it se-
cret from Calvin) using codes of computational complexity
O(poly(C, log2 q)) and error probability O(q−C).
Combining the codes in Theorem 1 with the “shared-secret”
codes in [3] then gives us the following theorem.
Theorem 2: No rate higher than C − ZO − ZI is achiev-
able. A rate of C − ZO − ZI is achievable with codes of
computational complexity O(npoly(C, log2 q)).
Note: In [1], Ngai et al show that C − 2ZO −ZI is an upper
bound on the rate, assuming no error events, and single-letter
coding (respectively equations (87) and (65) in their proof).
Our work achieves higher rates by instead assuming asymp-
totically negligible probability of error, and block coding.
A. High-level overview of proofs and techniques
We first show in Section IV that C −ZO −ZI is an upper
bound on the rate at which a secret message can be correctly
transmitted from Alice to Bob, by demonstrating an attack that
Calvin can use to successfully disrupt communication if Alice
tries to communicate at any higher rate. We then construct
efficient codes that essentially achieve rate C − ZO − ZI .
Our codes consist of the three layers described below. All the
three layers are embedded along with Alice’s message into
her packets and then transmitted through the network using
random linear network codes.
Secret-sharing layer: In Section VI we first prove Theorem 1
by showing how to communicate a single bit secretly and
correctly over a network containing adversaries that can jam
and eavesdrop, as long as C > ZI + ZO. This layer is
important for the error-control layer described later, and can be
implemented via a “small” header appended to each network
coded packet. When k secret bits are to be shared, the scheme
is repeated k times in each transmitted packet header, for a
secret-sharing header of total length C + kC(C − ZI). The
secret-sharing layer consisting of the following components:
1. Identity matrix: As standard in random linear network
coding [21], [13], the identity matrix IC is appended to convey
to the receiver information about the linear transform induced
by the random linear network code.
2. Bit matrices: For each secret bit, i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, if the ith
secret bit equals 0, the (C − ZI) × C(C − ZI) matrix Si
(over Fq) is chosen as a zero matrix; otherwise, Si is chosen
independently and uniformly at random from all (C − ZI)×
C(C − ZI) matrices. We refer to Si as a bit matrix. The
idea is that the rank of the matrices corresponding to bit 0 is
much smaller than the rank of the matrices corresponding to
bit 1—due to the limitation on the numbers of packets Calvin
can observe or inject, with high probability he cannot change
the rank of the corresponding received matrix by too much.
Details are given in Lemma 3.
3.Random matrix: Alice adapts the scheme of [7] to keep the
bit matrices secret from Calvin. That is, for each secret bit i
that Alice wishes to communicate to Bob, she combines the
bit matrix Si with a random noise matrix N i (at rate ZI ).
It can be shown that it is impossible for Calvin to glean any
useful information (since it can only eavesdrop at rate ZI).
Section VII combines the secrecy layer with the two other
layers described below to complete our code construction.
Secrecy layer: As done with the random matrices N i in
the secret-sharing layer above, a random matrix N is used
to preserve the secrecy of the source message S (of rate
C−ZO−ZI ), yielding a encoded matrix M (of rate C−ZO).
Error control layer: In this layer Alice uses the “shared-
secret” scheme outlined in Theorem 1 of [3]. That is, Alice
first takes a secret linear hash to her secrecy-encoded message
M to generate a small hash value. Both the linear hash and
the resulting hash value (say k bits in all) are transmitted to
Bob using the secret-sharing layer. Alice then combines her
data with a zero-value matrix (of rate ZO), such that Bob can
use the secret hash to distill Alice’s codeword M from the
corrupted information reaching the destination.
Vis-a-vis our secret-sharing scheme of Section VI, the work
of [2] (by a subset of the authors of this work) claimed to have
the same result. However, we show in Section VIII that the
scheme proposed in [2] is incorrect by giving an attack that
Calvin can use to ensure that Bob has a significant probability
of decoding error.
III. NETWORK MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We use the general model proposed in [3]. To simplify
notation we consider only the problem of communicating from
a single source to a single destination2.
A. Network Model
Alice communicates to Bob over a network with an attacker
(adversary) Calvin hidden somewhere in it. Calvin aims to
disrupt the transfer of information from Alice to Bob and in
the meantime eavesdrop the information Alice sends. He can
observe some of the transmissions, and can inject his own fake
transmissions.
Calvin is computationally unbounded, knows the encoding
and decoding schemes of Alice and Bob, and the network
code implemented by the interior nodes. He also knows the
network topology, and he gets to choose which network links
to eavesdrop on and which ones to corrupt.
The network is modeled as a directed and delay-free graph
whose edges each have capacity equal to one symbol of a
finite field of size q, Fq , per unit time3. All computations are
over Fq. The network capacity, denoted by C, is the min-cut
from source to destination4.
2Similarly to many network coding algorithms, our techniques generalize
to multicast problems.
3For ease of presentation edges with non-unit capacities are not considered
here (as in [3], they may be modeled via block coding and parallel edges).
4For the corresponding multicast case, C is defined as the minimum of
the min-cuts over all destinations. It is well-known that C also equals the
time-average of the maximum number of packets that can be delivered from
Alice to Bob, assuming no adversarial interference, i.e., the max flow.
Each packet contains n symbols from Fq. Alice’s message
is denoted S ∈ S. To send this to Bob over the network, Alice
encodes it into a matrix X ∈ FC×nq , possibly using a stochastic
encoder5. The ith row in X is Alice’s ith packet. As in [21],
Alice and internal nodes in take random linear combinations
of their observed packets to generate their transmitted packets.
Analogously to how Alice generates X , Bob organizes
received packets into a matrix Y . The ith received packet
corresponds to the ith row of Y . The random linear network
code used by Alice and all internal nodes induces a linear
transform A from X to Y , such that Y = AX when no
error is induced by the adversary6. Thus Y is a matrix in
F
C×n
q , and A ∈ FC×Cq . Hereafter we assume that the matrix
A is invertible, which happens with high probability if q is
sufficiently large [21].
Calvin can eavesdrop on ZI edges, and can inject (possibly
fake) information at ZO locations7, in the network. The
matrix received by Bob is then Y = AX + Z , where Z
corresponds to the information injected by Calvin as seen by
Bob. Note that the limitation of Calvin’s jamming capacity
implies that rank(Z) ≤ ZO. Similarly, Calvin’s observation
can be described as a matrix W = BX , where B ∈ FZI×Cq
is the linear transform undertaken by X as seen by Calvin.
B. Problem Statement
Alice wishes to communicate with Bob with perfect secrecy
and vanishingly small error probability. That is, Alice’s scheme
is perfectly secret if
I(S;W ) = 0 ∀B ∈ FZI×Cq (1)
i.e., Calvin obtains no information about Alice’s message. The
error probability is the probability that Bob’s reconstruction
Sˆ of Alice’s information S is inaccurate, i.e., P [Sˆ 6= S].
We consider the error probability of the worst-case scenario8.
Namely, a scheme has error probability less than ǫ if P [Sˆ 6=
S] < ǫ ∀A,Z , where A is assumed to be nonsingular, and
rank(Z) ≤ ZO. The rate R of a scheme is the number
of information bits of information Alice transmits to Bob,
amortized by the size of a packet in bits, i.e., R = 1
n
logq |S|.
The rate R is said to be achievable if for any ǫ > 0, any
δ > 0, and sufficiently large n, there exists a perfectly secret
block-length-n network code with rate at least R − δ and a
probability of error less than ǫ.
IV. CONVERSE FOR THEOREM 2
We start by presenting an attack that Calvin may use to
force the achievable rate to at most C − ZO − ZI , thereby
5The random coin tosses made by Alice as part of her encoding scheme
are not known to either Calvin or Bob.
6For the ease of notation we assume Bob removes redundant incoming
edges so that the number of edges reaching Bob equals the min-cut capacity
C from Alice to Bob.
7We assume throughout that the information injected into the network by
Calvin is added to the original information transmitted (here we consider
addition over our field Fq).
8Our interest is to design communication schemes that do not rely on the
specific network topology or network code used.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF COMMONLY USED NOTATION
Notation Meaning
C Capacity
ZI Eavesdropping rate
ZO Jamming rate
n Packet length
q Field size
Q = qC Extension field size
demonstrating that this is indeed an upper bound on the
achievable rate. Let {e1, e2, ..., eC} be a set of edges that
form a cut from Alice to Bob. Calvin jams the edges in
{e1, e2, ..., eZO} by adding random errors on them. Further,
Calvin eavesdrops on edges in {eZO+1, eZO+2, ..., eZO+ZI}.
Let X be the random variable denoting Alice’s information.
Let Yj , Ye, and Yu be the random variables denoting the
packets carried by the jammed edges {e1, e2, ..., eZO}, eaves-
dropped edges {eZO+1, eZO+2, ..., eZO+ZI}, and untouched
edges {eZO+ZI+1, eZO+ZI+2, ..., eC} respectively. Let Y be
the random variable denoting the packets received by Bob.
Then
nR = H(X) = H(X|Y) + I(X;Y) (2)
≤ 1 + ǫnR+ I(X;Y) (3)
≤ 1 + ǫnR+ I(X;Yj ,Ye,Yu) (4)
= 1+ ǫnR+ I(X;Ye,Yu) (5)
= 1+ ǫnR+ I(X;Ye) + I(X;Yu|Ye) (6)
= 1+ ǫnR+ I(X;Yu|Ye) (7)
≤ 1 + ǫnR+H(Yu) (8)
≤ n
[
(C − ZI − ZO) + ǫR+
1
n
]
. (9)
Here (2) follows from the fact that Alice’s message is uni-
formly distributed over X, (3) from Fano’s inequality, (4) from
the data processing inequality, (5) since Calvin adds random
noise on the edges he jams and so Yj is independent of
(X,Ye,Yu), (6) by the chain rule for mutual information,
(7) from the fact that information-theoretic secrecy is required
and so I(X;Ye) = 0, (8) by the fact that conditioning reduces
entropy and the definition of mutual information, and finally
(9) by the fact that there are at most C − ZI − ZO links
corresponding to the random variable Yu and the alphabet-
size upper bound on entropy. Requiring ǫ → 0 as n → ∞
gives the required result.
V. AUXILIARY TOOLS
A. Secrecy Coding
Consider a special case of the problem where Calvin can
eavesdrop ZI < C packets but cannot jam any packets
(ZO = 0). Below, we review a construction of a perfectly
secret scheme that asymptotically achieves the maximum
possible rate (i.e., the secrecy capacity) R = C − ZI . The
scheme, proposed in [7], is based on MRD codes. (For more
details on MRD codes, see [7].)
Let Q = qC and let FQ be an extension field of Fq.
Let φ : FQ → F1×Cq be a vector space isomorphism. In
addition, let φm,n : Fm×nQ → Fm×Cnq be a vector space
isomorphism such that the ith row of φm,n(X) is given by[
φ(Xi,1) · · · φ(Xi,n)
]
. In other words, we expand each
element of X ∈ Fm×nQ as a length-C row vector over Fq (with
the number of columns in matrix increasing accordingly). We
will omit the subscript from φm,n when the dimensions of the
argument are clear from the context.
Let H ∈ F(C−ZI)×CQ be the parity-check matrix of a [C,ZI ]
linear MRD code over FQ. Let T ∈ FC×CQ be an invertible
matrix chosen such that the first C−ZI rows of T−1 are equal
to H . Assume that n is divisible by C and let n′ = n/C − 1.
In order to encode a given message S ∈ F(C−ZI)×n
′
Q , Alice
first generates a random matrix N ∈ FZI×n
′
Q uniformly and
independently from any other variables. Then, she computes
X =
[
IC φ(x)
]
, where x = T
[
S
N
]
.
After receiving Y = AX =
[
A Aφ(x)
]
, Bob computes
X = A−1Y to recover x = φ−1(φ(x)). Then, Bob can easily
obtain S since, by construction, S = Hx.
Recall that Calvin’s observation is given by W = BX ,
where B ∈ FZI×Cq . According to Theorem 4 of [7], we have
that I(S;W ) = 0 for all B, and therefore (1) is satisfied.
Thus, the scheme is indeed perfectly secret.
The decoding complexity is given by O(nC2) operations in
FQ, which can be done in O(nC4) operations in Fq.
B. Error Control under a Shared Secret Model
Consider now the case where Calvin can jam ZO < C
packets and eavesdrop any number of packets he choose.
However, we drop the requirement of secret communication,
i.e., all we require is that Bob can decode correctly. In addition,
suppose the existence of a low rate side channel, which Calvin
cannot access, that enables Alice to transmit to Bob a small
secret S. Below, we review a coding scheme presented in [3]
that can asymptotically achieve the maximum possible rate
R = C − ZO.
Let b = C −ZO. We first describe how Alice produces the
secret bit string S based on a given message M ∈ Fb×(n−b)q . To
begin with, she generates α = bC+1 symbols ρ1, ρ2, ..., ρα ∈
Fq independently and uniformly at random. Let P ∈ Fn×αq
be the matrix given by P(i,j) = (ρj)i. Then, she computes
a matrix H = X¯P ∈ Fb×αq , where X¯ =
[
Ib M
]
. The
tuple (ρ1, ρ2, ..., ρα,H), consisting in total of α(b+1) symbols
in Fq, comprises the message “hash” that should be secretly
transmitted to Bob. The bit representation of this tuple yields
the string S ∈ {0, 1}k, consisting of k = α(b + 1) log2 q
bits. Over the main channel, Alice transmits the C×n matrix
X =
[
X¯
0
]
=
[
Ib M
0 0
]
.
Assuming that (ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρα,H) is secretly and correctly
received by Bob, let us proceed to the description of Bob’s
decoder. First, Bob reconstructs the matrix P . Bob obtains
Y = AX + Z , where Z ∈ FC×nq has rank at most ZO. This
can also be written as Y = A˜X¯ +Z , where A˜ consists of the
first b columns of A. Let Y¯ be the reduced row echelon form of
Y . It is shown in [3] that, with probability at least 1−O(1/q)
for any fixed network, X¯ can be written as X¯ = UY¯ for
some U ∈ Fb×Cq . It is also shown in [3] that, with probability
at least 1−nα/q, the system UY¯ P = H has a unique solution
in U . Bob solves this system to find U , computes X¯ = UY¯
and finally recovers M .
Overall, the probability of error of the scheme is at most
nα/q +O(1/q) = O(nC
2
/q), while the decoding complexity
is O(nC3) operations in Fq .
VI. SENDING A SINGLE BIT SECRETLY AND RELIABLY
Let C′ = C − ZI . In this section, we show how Alice can
transmit a secret bit reliably to Bob when C > ZI +ZO. We
assume that n = C(1 + C′), as this is the smallest packet
length required for the scheme to work. Larger packet lengths
can be easily handled by zero-padding the transmitted packets.
Let T ∈ FC×CQ and H ∈ F
C′×C
Q be as given in Section V-A.
A. Alice’s encoder
Initially, Alice chooses a matrix S ∈ FC
′×C′
Q according
to her secret bit: if the bit is 1, she picks S uniformly at
random; otherwise, if the bit is 0, she sets S = 0. Then,
she sends S to Bob using the secrecy scheme described in
Section V-A. More precisely, she transmits X =
[
IC φ(x)
]
,
where x = T
[
S
N
]
and N ∈ FZI×C
′
Q is a uniformly random
matrix chosen independently from S.
B. Bob’s decoder
Recall that Bob receives a matrix Y = AX + Z , where
A ∈ FC×Cq is nonsingular and Z ∈ F
C×C(1+C′)
q has rank
at most ZO. Let Y¯ denote the reduced row echelon form of
Y . Consider first the case where Y¯ =
[
I φ(r)
]
, for some
r ∈ FC×C
′
Q . It is possible to show that Hr = S + E, where
E ∈ FC
′×C′
Q is a matrix of rank at most ZO. As will be
shown later, with high probability, Hr is full-rank if and only
if Alice’s secret bit is 1. Thus, Bob can decode by computing
the rank of Hr.
In general, however, Y¯ may not have the form described
above. Nevertheless, as shown in [13], [17], it is possible to
extract from Y¯ some matrices r ∈ FC×C
′
Q , Lˆ ∈ F
C×µ
q and
Vˆ ∈ Fδ×C
′
Q such that
r = x+ LˆV 1 + L2Vˆ + L3V 3
for some V 1 ∈ Fµ×C
′
Q , L
2 ∈ FC×δq , L
3 ∈ FC×ǫq and V 3 ∈
F
ǫ×C′
Q . Moreover, it is shown in [17] that µ, δ ≤ ZO and
ǫ ≤ ZO −max{µ, δ}.
Note that ǫ < C′ −max{µ, δ}, since ZO < C′.
In possession of r, Lˆ and Vˆ , Bob is now ready to decode
the secrecy layer that has been applied to x.
We have
Hr = Hx+HLˆV 1 +HL2Vˆ +HL3V 3
= S + ΛˆV 1 + Λ2Vˆ + Λ3V 3 (10)
where Λˆ = HLˆ, Λ2 = HL2 and Λ3 = HL3. Note that Λˆ ∈
F
C′×µ
Q and Vˆ ∈ F
δ×C′
Q are known.
Now, let J ∈ F(C
′−µ)×C′
Q and K ∈ F
C′×(C′−δ)
Q be full-
rank matrices such that JΛˆ = 0 and Vˆ K = 0. Then Bob can
further simplify (10) by computing
JHrK = JSK + JΛ3V 3K.
Note that rank(JΛ3V 3K) ≤ ǫ < C′ −max{µ, δ}.
Thus, Bob performs the following test. If JHrK is full-
rank, then Bob concludes that bit 1 was sent; otherwise, Bob
concludes that bit 0 was sent.
With respect to complexity, computing Y¯ takes O(C2n) =
O(C4) operations in Fq . Computing J , K , JHrK and the
rank of JHrK each take O(C3) operations in FQ, which
amounts to O(C5) in Fq. Thus, the overall decoding com-
plexity is O(C5) operations in Fq .
C. Probability of error analysis
When bit 0 is sent, Bob never makes an error; he makes
an error if and only if bit 1 is sent and JHrK is not
full-rank. Recall that, when bit 1 is sent, S is uniformly
distributed over FC
′×C′
Q . Due to the secrecy encoding, Calvin
has no information about S, and therefore S is statistically
independent from Λ3V 3. It follows that S′ = S + Λ3V 3 is
also uniformly distributed over FC
′×C′
Q . Thus, the probability
of error when bit 1 is sent is equal to the probability that
JS′K ∈ F(C
′−µ)×(C′−δ)
Q is not full-rank for a uniform S′.
Lemma 3: If S′ ∈ FC
′×C′
Q is uniformly distributed then,
for any J ∈ F(C
′−µ)×C′
Q and any K ∈ F
C′×(C′−δ)
Q , the matrix
JS′K is full-rank with probability at least 1− C′/Q.
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume µ ≥ δ. It
suffices to prove the statement for µ = δ; if µ > δ, then
removing µ− δ columns from K cannot possibly increase the
rank of JS′K .
For any fixed J and K , consider the entries of S′ as
variables taking values in FQ. Then each entry of JS′K is
a multivariate polynomial over FQ with degree at most 1. It
follows that det(JS′K) is a multivariate polynomial over FQ
with degree at most C′ − µ ≤ C′. Note that, if Q ≤ C′,
the statement follows trivially, so assume Q > C′. From [21,
Lemma 4], we have that P [det(JS′K) = 0] ≤ C′/Q.
Thus, the probability of error of the scheme is upper
bounded by C′/Q ≤ C/qC , which can be made arbitrarily
small by choosing q sufficiently large. This proves Theorem 1.
VII. ACHIEVABILITY FOR THEOREM 2
We now describe a coding scheme that achieves rate R =
C − ZI − ZO asymptotically in the packet length n.
As before, assume that n is divisible by C and let n′ =
n/C − (1 + kC′), where k = (bC + 1)(b+ 1) log2 q.
Let H ∈ FC
′×C
Q be the parity-check matrix of a [C,ZI ]
linear MRD code over FQ. Let T ∈ FC×CQ be an invertible
matrix such that the first C−ZI rows of T−1 are equal to H .
Similarly, let H0 ∈ FR×bQ be the parity-check matrix of a
[b, ZI ] linear MRD code over FQ, and let T0 ∈ Fb×bQ be an
invertible matrix such that the first R rows of T−10 are equal
to H0.
A. Alice’s encoder
First, given a message S ∈ FR×n
′
Q , Alice computes
x = T0
[
S
N
]
, where N ∈ FZI×n
′
Q is chosen independently
and uniformly at random. Then, she sets M = φ(x) and
generates a string S ∈ {0, 1}k of k bits according to the
scheme described in Section V-B. Next, for each ith bit of
S, Alice produces a matrix Si ∈ FC
′×C′
Q according to the
scheme described in Section VI. Then, for each i = 1, . . . , k,
she computes xi = T
[
Si
N i
]
, where each N i ∈ FZI×C
′
Q is
chosen uniformly at random and independently from any other
variables. Finally, she produces a transmission matrix
X =
[
IC φ(x
1) φ(x2) · · · φ(xk)
[
M
0
]]
.
B. Bob’s decoder
For each i = 1, . . . , k, Bob extracts a submatrix Y i from
Y corresponding to the submatrix
[
IC φ(x
i)
]
from X (i.e.,
columns 1, . . . , C, C + (i − 1)C′ + 1, . . . , C + iC′). He then
applies on Y i the decoder described in Section VI to obtain
each ith bit of S.
Similarly, Bob extracts a submatrix Y 0 consisting of the first
b and the last n′C rows of Y . Note that Y 0 = AX0 + Z0,
where X0 =
[
Ib M
0 0
]
∈ F
C×(b+n′C)
q and Z0 has rank
at most ZO. Then, Bob applies the decoder described in
Section V-B to obtain M .
Finally, Bob computes x = φ−1(M) and S = H0x.
C. Overall Analysis
1) Secrecy analysis: The secrecy of the message is guar-
anteed by the scheme of Section V-A.
2) Error probability analysis: By the union bound, the
probability that Bob makes an error when decoding the k-
bit secret S is at most kC/qC ≤ C4(log2 q)/qC = O(
log
2
q
qC
).
Given that the secret is decoded correctly, the probability that
Bob makes an error when decoding the message is at most
O(nC
2
/q). Thus, the overall probability of error is at most
O(nC
2
/q).
3) Rate analysis: The rate of the scheme is given by
Rn′C/n = R(1 − (1 + kC′)C/n) ≤ R − RC5(log2 q)/n.
Thus, the rate loss is O( log2 q
n
).
4) Complexity analysis: Decoding all the secret bits takes
O(kC5) = O(C8 log2 q) operations in Fq, while decoding
the message is dominated by the secrecy decoding step with
O(C4n) operations in Fq.
Note: Both the rate loss and the error probability can be
made asymptotically small by choosing q to grow faster than
polynomially but slower than exponentially in n. For instance,
we may choose q = 2⌊
√
n⌋
.
VIII. ERRATA FOR [2]
We briefly reprise the scheme of [2] before demonstrating
the flaw in the proof. In what follows, all operations are over
Fq.
In the scheme of [2] there exist two hash matrices D0 and
D1 which are chosen independently and uniformly at random
C2(C − ZO)× C
2 Vandermonde matrices, i.e., each column
of D0 and D1 is of the form h(u) = [u, u2, ..., uC
2(C−ZO)]T ,
where the generator u is chosen independently and uniformly
at random from Fq . Both D0 and D1 are publicly known to
all parties, including Bob and Calvin.
Alice’s Encoder: Alice first chooses a random length-
(C2(C−ZO)−C
2) row vector u. Let I ∈ {0, 1} be the secret
bit that Alice wishes to send to Bob. Alice then constructs the
length-1 × C2 row vector r such that [u, r]DI = 0. Note
that such r exists since the last C2 rows of DI form an
invertible matrix. Finally the vector [u, r] is rearranged into
a (C − ZO) × C
2 matrix which is sent through the network
via random linear network coding.
Bob’s Decoder: After receiving the C × C2 matrix Y ,
for each I ∈ {0, 1} Bob check whether there exists
C − ZO length-C vectors {xi, i ∈ [1, C − ZO]} such that
[x1Y,x2Y, ...,xC−ZOY ]DI = 0. If so, Bob decodes the
secret bit as I . The idea is that if I is Alice’s bit, such
{xi, i ∈ [1, C − ZO]} exists for DI with high probability [3].
Calvin’s successful attack: When Calvin corrupts ZO ≥
C−ZO edges, Calvin could mimic Alice’s behaviour when she
wishes to transmit a particular bit, say 1. As a result Bob would
always find length-C row vectors {xi, i ∈ [1, C − ZO]} such
that [x1Y,x2Y, ...,xC−ZOY ]D1 = 0. In this case Bob cannot
determine whether the bit 1 is from Alice or from Calvin.
Even if Calvin can only inject ZO < C−ZO errors, if ZO+
ZI ≥ C − ZO, there is another successful attack for Calvin.
To see that, without loss of generality let ZO+ZI = C−ZO.
Since Calvin can eavesdrop on ZI packets {yi, i ∈ [1, ZI ]},
he can carefully choose his ZO injected error packets {zi, i ∈
[1, ZO]} so that [y1, ...,yZI , z1, ..., zZO ]D1 = 0. In this case,
Bob also always decodes its bit as 1. Thus the scheme in [2]
only works for the case where C > 2ZO + ZI , which does
not improve the result in [3].
Why our scheme works: In our scheme Section VI, instead
of distinguishing the bit by the hash matrices, Alice hides her
secret in the rank of the bit matrix she transmits. In particular,
there is a rank gap C−ZI between the bit matrix for bit 0 and
the one for bit 1. Thus as long as C−ZI > ZO, Calvin cannot
mimic Alice any more, since he can only inject ZO errors. As
a result Bob can determine Alice’s bit by examining the rank
of the matrix he decodes.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this work we considered the problem of communicating
information secretly and reliably over a network containing
a malicious eavesdropping and jamming adversary. Under
the assumptions that vanishingly small probabilities of error
and block coding are allowed, we substantially improve on
the best achievable rates in prior work [1], and also prove
the optimality of our achievable rates. A key component of
our code design is a scheme that allows a small amount
of information to be transmitted secretly and reliably over
the network, as long as the total number of packets that
the adversary can either eavesdrop on or jam is less than
the communication capacity of the network. In proving this
scheme we correct an error in the proof of prior work [2] by
a subset of the authors of this work.
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